

Mountain Boy organization. Future Green Mountain Boys were integrally connected to the New York rioters by a complex web of riot participants, their close kinsmen (because of their interfamilial migration origins), and former rioters who became the Boys' neighbors in western Vermont. Among the rioters were over 100 western Vermonters, thirty-six of whom became prominent Green Mountain Boys.⁵³ Although not documented as Green Mountain Boys, sixty-five other rioters were early western Vermont settlers and avid supporters of Vermont's cause. As well, sixty Green Mountain Boys were closely related to the New York rioters.

Overall, the migration figures show that far from moving to Vermont to avoid conflict, increasing numbers of Yankee migrants embraced the movement. A total of 471 refugees from the riot impact zones had settled in western Vermont by the time of Ethan Allen's arrival; 324 of them came from the New York manors alone. Moreover, the periods of greatest migration from those zones into western Vermont coincided directly with the emergence of Green Mountain resistance, 335 men arriving from 1764 to 1769. Of another 910 settlers who arrived from 1770 to 1775—the most violent years of Green Mountain Boy insurgency—336 had come from the riot impact zones. Two hundred and fifty were from the New York manors, and fifty-two became Green Mountain Boys.⁵⁴ These migrants came to join the Boys and thwart New York.

From the outset of early western Vermont settlement, signs of Green Mountain Boy resistance to New York quickly appeared. Patterned after the Claverack model of conflicting mobs and sheriffs' posses operating under competing jurisdictional legal authorities, settler evictions and land riots reappeared in three southwestern Vermont towns beginning in 1761.⁵⁵ The Bennington Mob, as it was called, led the way.

In 1760–1761 Separate religious leader Deacon Samuel Robinson led a migratory movement of religious refugees from Norwich, Connecticut; Amenia, New York; and Hardwick, Massachusetts, to Bennington, Vermont.⁵⁶ Robinson not only held numerous New Hampshire Grant shares in Bennington and many surrounding southwestern Vermont towns, but both he and his son Samuel were commissioned as constables by New Hampshire governor Wentworth.

Under those commissions and with the assistance of resident New Hampshire Grants proprietors from the towns of Arlington, Bennington, and Pownal, Robinson and his men proceeded against earlier New York settlers in those towns from 1761 to 1764. They forcibly evicted Dutch settlers of New York's Hoosic Patent, which impinged upon those southwestern Vermont towns. The Van Rensselaers claimed both the Hoosic Patent and the Vermont towns included within it. During one of these ejectment actions, Samuel Robinson Jr. was captured by the Albany County

sheriff and imprisoned for two months. New York officials also issued arrest warrants for the other rioters, causing the town of Bennington to establish its own militia company in 1764 to resist New York authorities.⁵⁷

Political developments forced a hiatus in the evolution of the Green Mountain Boy organization. The 1764 king's order in council confirming New York jurisdiction over Vermont prompted two developments: New York partially suspended its land grant objectives in western Vermont, awaiting royal clarification of land grant instructions; and in late 1766 Deacon Robinson sailed for England to present the grantsmen's cause to the king and council.⁵⁸ He carried to London petitions signed by hundreds of western Grants residents and nonresident proprietors, a strategy similar to the petition movement being conducted by former rioters in Beekman's and Philipse's Patents. Robinson died of smallpox in London nine months later. Soon thereafter, because of the negligible results of the Robinson mission to England—and like the Philipse and Claverack rioters before them—the Benningtonites organized a subscription movement to repurchase their lands from the Wappinger Indians.⁵⁹

The year 1769 was crucial to Green Mountain Boy organizational development. It marked the arrival of Ethan Allen on the western Grants and the accession in September of Cadwallader Colden to the office of New York lieutenant governor. Thereafter, New York's waiting policy ceased, New York land grants in western Vermont resumed, and New York surveyors returned to the western grants. On October 19, 1769, the Albany County sheriff and New York surveyors arrived at the Bennington farm of James Breakenridge to subdivide his lands under the authority of New York's 1739 Wallumschack Grant. Like the Claverack and Nobletown rioters of the 1750s, large numbers of Bennington militiamen gathered, fortified Breakenridge's house, and forced the Yorkers to depart.⁶⁰ After a five-year interruption, the land war with New York resumed, but with substantial influence from New York rioters well established in the region.

TRANSFORMATION OF NEW YORK'S LAND WAR: GREEN MOUNTAIN INSURGENCY, 1770–1775

No immediate successor to Deacon Robinson appeared, and Ethan Allen was an unlikely replacement. Allen, a well-known deist with Anglican religious origins, claimed leadership among devout Calvinist Separates. He applied natural rights Enlightenment philosophy to a cause already endorsed by men whose political dissidence and radical republican politics had unique religious origins dating back to the Puritan revolution of the 1640s.

Furthermore, Ethan Allen was neither elected nor acclaimed as mili-

tary leader of the Green Mountain Boys, nor was he certified as the religious-political prophet of Vermont independence. Rather, he proclaimed himself its leader. Consummate politician that he was, Colonel Allen did, however, have some appeal for all parties. He seemed to combine the strands of life experience characteristic of western Vermonters: personal and business enterprise, previous residences, and varied religious background—all of which led back to the riot impact zones.

During the late 1750s, Allen contracted a partnership with French and Indian War veteran Colonel John Hazeltine in the Lakeville furnace of the Salisbury, Connecticut, ironworks. Hazeltine, a radical Separate agitator from Sutton, Massachusetts, and speculator in New Hampshire Grants lands, later moved to the eastern Vermont town of Townshend. In 1775 he became an early advocate of the Green Mountain cause. Hazeltine's business connections also involved Colonel John Ashley of Sheffield, Massachusetts, a co-investor in both the Livingston Manor Ancram and Lakeville ironworks.⁶¹ Ashley instigated anti-New York rioting in Livingston Manor during the early 1750s. Allen also associated with another man whose business interests directly connected to the riot impact zones and the whole land war controversy: Thomas Young of Amenia, New York, a major center of riotous agitation and the migration origin of fifty-two future Green Mountain Boys. Young also speculated in Vermont land, forming in the early 1760s a business partnership with Colonel John Lydius of Albany, New York. In the early 1740s, Lydius obtained from Massachusetts governor William Shirley a land grant confirmation of Mohawk Indian deeds to the area subsequently known as Clarendon, Vermont. Young and Lydius increased their acreage by purchasing additional Mohawk rights near Clarendon.⁶² Lydius was the same Massachusetts government agent who bailed and defended 1750s rioters on Livingston Manor.⁶³

Allen's residences in Salisbury, Connecticut, and Sheffield, Massachusetts, put him in the riot impact zones at the right time and place to witness and absorb land war tactics and also to advance his religious training. He imbibed his religion from moderate New Light preacher Reverend Jonathan Lee of Salisbury and radical deist Thomas Young, with whom he studied Enlightenment theology and politics.⁶⁴

From the summer of 1770 to the early winter of 1775, the Green Mountain Boy organization moved from the defensive tactics of riot and resistance to offensive insurgency.⁶⁵ Three simultaneous events spurred the remarkable transformation: Ethan Allen joined the movement; the pace of New York intervention in the western Grants quickened; and, in consequence, Green Mountain Boy resistance greatly intensified. The events of these years demonstrate two major and interrelated organizational trends. The first, evident from close comparison of the Boys' and

former New York rioters' activities, shows how the Boys appropriated and integrated the entire infrastructures and strategies of both the Claverack and Philipse models of riot, fusing them into a powerful form of extralegal government.

The second trend concerns the actual transformation process and the means by which political consensus was achieved within the Green Mountain Boy organization. In 1770 the organization was in an embryonic stage and consisted of an amalgam of groups with disparate political positions. Some favored submission to New York and New York reconfirmation of their New Hampshire Grants at reduced rates. Moderates, in contrast, wanted blanket reconfirmation at no cost and were willing to compromise and negotiate such ends. Then there were the radicals, the growing faction of former New York rioters who advocated a policy of confrontation with New York. As the previous western Vermont migration figures show, refugees from the New York riot impact zones continually augmented the ranks of this last group until they gained numerical superiority in 1774. Ethan Allen appealed to this radical faction, and because of structural ambiguity arising from the organization's equal distribution of power among all three governmental branches, he was able to proclaim unchallenged military leadership of the Boys.

During the period from 1770 to 1775, Allen used his military role to eliminate the submissive, isolate the moderates, provoke New York into harsher measures against the Boys, and thereby motivate the infuriated radicals to retaliate against New York. Those who did not jump on the bandwagon were left by the wayside. Meanwhile, the moderates were supplanted, and the organizational locus of power shifted to the former New York rioters, their relatives, and refugees from the New York riot zones. These men drove the movement toward separation from New York. Evidence of the Allen brothers' consciousness of these political realities appeared in a political pamphlet Ira Allen issued in 1779. As a rallying cry to fortify Vermont's resistance to New York, Ira recalled the earlier phases of the land war against New York and its military suppression. The rioters, he asserted, "seldom failed of losing their lives, and being vanquished by their adversaries—witness Nobletown, Livingston's manor, and Bateman's [Beekman's] Patent."⁶⁶

The Benningtonites' loss of primacy in Green Mountain councils—they had held undisputed leadership up to 1771—and the cessation of the Boys' conventions at Bennington in the summer of 1772 illustrate Ethan Allen's role in encouraging the rift between the Boys' political and military branches. The breach began in the spring of 1772, when New York governor William Tryon made peace overtures to Bennington, inviting its political leaders to a conference but specifically excluding Ethan Allen

and his military associates. Allen responded with a letter of strong protest, which was reluctantly delivered to Tryon by Bennington's agents, Deacon Stephen Fay and his son Dr. Jonas Fay. They parleyed with Tryon in mid-June 1772 and presented the results to the Bennington convention in mid-July. The terms of peace were favorable to the moderates. For its part, New York agreed to equitable negotiations of overlapping grants, favorable treatment of all original New Hampshire Grants settlers by the New York proprietors, and suspension of all New York ejectment suits and criminal prosecutions against the Boys. In turn, the Boys were obligated to obey all New York laws, suspend harassment of settlers under New York titles, and allow the dispossessed to return in peace.⁶⁷

The Green Mountain Boys' military arm, under the Allens' leadership, inadvertently violated the peace agreement, creating widespread political ramifications within the organization. While the Fays negotiated with Tryon, Ethan and Ira Allen directed Seth Warner and Remember Baker to lead the Boys in an operation to remove New York settlers from Pantton, Vermont, and arrest New York surveyor Will Cockburn. Governor Tryon in turn revoked his peace truce and unduly threatened the entire Green Mountain Boy organization. The upshot of this interchange was that the military took control of the organization and removed the convention site to Manchester, Vermont. The home of five former New York rioters and many migrants from the riot center of Amenia, Manchester remained the Green Mountain Boy convention site until January 1775. Thereafter the seat of Green Mountain leadership and conventions shifted to Dorset, Vermont, where (along with nearby Danby, Vermont) four other former New York rioters and many of their close relatives resided.

In addition to manipulating the organization's internal politics, Ethan Allen actively recruited former New York rioters and inherent anti-New Yorkers. The best example of this policy is Allen's recruitment of Micah Vail. The Vail family of southern Dutchess County was deeply involved in the early New York rioting. Captain Micah Vail was the very same "Micah Veal" of Quaker Hill on the Nine Partners Precinct of southeastern Dutchess County whom the antiret rioter committee of that precinct had commissioned as a "mob captain" in 1765.⁶⁸

Vail, one of the captured rioters sentenced to death for riotous treason and eventually reprieved, fled to Danby sometime in late 1766. Ethan Allen cultivated his friendship and finally obtained his commitment to the Green Mountain cause in April 1774, after having asked Vail to "form the inhabitants of your Town into Military Order, and assume your former command and assist us in Humbling the Haughty Land Jobbers at New York."⁶⁹ Because Vail had never held any official military commission

prior to that time, Allen could only have hoped to solicit his previous experience as a rioter.

Vail led the insurgents who created the Philipse Patent riot organizational model that later provided such significant structural and operational examples for the Green Mountain Boys. Elected by popular vote, the political arm of the New York resistance movement was executive in nature and commanded the judicial and military branches. The rioters convened as "clubs" or voluntary associations, each of which elected a twelve-man ruling committee. Each committee in turn selected and appointed officers to command militia companies and a twelve-man judicial committee to convene legal hearings on renters' issues and try New York violators of mob law. Moreover, the legislative power of formulating mob law belonged to the executive political committee. All operational control thus emanated from the executive branch, which also directed the establishment of committees to organize squatters on Philipse's lands to purchase Wappinger Indian titles and usurp Philipse property claims. Riot club officials, although elected by the mob commonality, determined strategy and hired Connecticut lawyers to defend rioters subjected to New York arrests and ejectment suits.⁷⁰

Furthermore, executive political committees formulated strategy and mob law to be carried out by the military and confirmed by rioters' courts. With "blackened" faces, members of the military arm of the resistance rescued rioters from the clutches of New York posses and sheriffs—the lawmen subsequently tried for the crime of executing their sworn duties. New York offenders tried before such tribunals were required to face the judges' bench from the "judgment seat" consisting of four log rails.⁷¹ The Green Mountain Boys reproduced, with some structural refinements, this entire organizational model, right down to the "judgment seat" and "blackened" faces.⁷²

Three structural modifications or expansions differentiated the Green Mountain Boys' organization from the Philipse model. For one, political power derived from the western townships, which elected special committees of safety to direct resistance to New York. Thus when the entire membership of the Green Mountain Boy organization met in convention (another refinement), town safety committee representatives attended.⁷³ Similarly, these committees selected and appointed town militia officers and supervised military organization and training.

Third, as a logical outgrowth of rule by convention, the Green Mountain Boys considerably expanded legislative power. At ten conventions Green Mountain Boy delegates passed at least eighteen laws—more than double the number the Philipse rioters issued. These laws and resolutions demonstrate the extent of extralegal government the Boys created. Mob law involved four categories: (1) those applicable to local gover-

nance of western Vermont, (2) regulations directing military operations, (3) directives for the conduct of the judiciary, and (4) laws against the New York government.

Green Mountain laws for local governance were concerned mainly with interdicting all New York power over land titles and terminating New York governmental authority over the grants. Accordingly, all western Vermonters were prohibited from seeking original or New York confirmatory patents. Encouragement of the purchase of such patents was prohibited; encouragement of the purchase of New Hampshire Grant lands was lauded; and all settlers were directed to repurchase their lands under New Hampshire title. Directives ordered the dispossession of all settlers holding New York titles and their replacement with New Hampshire grantees reinstated by military force. All Vermont rioters arrested for obedience to such laws were to be rescued, and the New York officials who made the arrests were themselves to be punished. Furthermore, the convention eliminated New York authority in western Vermont by passing a law prohibiting all inhabitants from holding, accepting, or executing civil and legal commissions under New York authority. As well, Green Mountain law eventually prohibited the execution of New York civil legal process against Vermont debtors, whatever the source of their insolvency, just as the Philipse rioters had passed an injunction against all debtor suits.

Legislation applicable to the military and judicial branches of the organization showed that the Boys expected mob law to be enforced. They issued military directives to ensure military preparedness, including the construction of fortifications, armament supply, rapid operational readiness, militia drills, and training in guerrilla tactics. The judiciary, in contrast, could consist of ad hoc tribunals of either political elders or senior military officials. Legal officials had the power to both try and punish New York surveyors who trespassed on the Grants and all resident New York officials who exercised New York authority. Members of the insurgent organization were further empowered to inflict corporal punishment and property destruction decrees against all violators of the convention's laws. All New York officials on the Grants were forbidden from transporting violators of New York law off the Grants for trial in New York courts without explicit permission of Green Mountain Boy civil and military officials. For anyone who tried to capture Green Mountain Boy leaders in order to collect New York outlaw rewards, the punishment was death. In March 1774, when the New York government proscribed the Green Mountain Boy leadership under penalty of death, these laws were reissued with an admonition to the New York government that all retaliatory measures would be met with armed force, for the right

of self-preservation under natural law justified such resistance against a government that denied them justice and equality under the law.⁷⁴

The last refinement of the Philipse riot model gave equal powers to all three extralegal governmental branches within the Green Mountain Boy organization. The looseness of this structural arrangement provided Ethan Allen and the military with the opportunity to supersede the political and judicial branches, establish military tribunals of mob justice, and launch terrorist raids against entire recalcitrant communities in western Vermont in 1773 and 1774.⁷⁵ Military ascendancy in Green Mountain councils ensured consequent radicalization of the movement, drastic measures against New York, political empowerment of western Vermonters connected to the former New York rioters, and outright rebellion.

CONCLUSION: THE "GREEN MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION"

In view of their renegade political behavior, it is no wonder that the Green Mountain Boys are still such a controversial group. Anathema to their enemies, inscrutable to historians, their own motivations overshadowed by their leaders' economic purposes, they sustained the enmity of all parties and the approbation of none. Nevertheless, in the annals of Revolutionary America, the Green Mountain Boys' achievements were remarkable for a frontier environment focused on survival. They won the forty-year land war against New York, sustaining their independence until 1791, when New York compromised and negotiated a final settlement of property issues. As participants in the earlier New York land riots and refugees from the riot impact zones, they carried their experience northward, where they re-created, amalgamated, and perfected the two models of New York rioting, molding them into the Green Mountain Boy organization. On the eve of the Revolution, they fused disparate groups of western Vermonters into a highly motivated, insurgent organization replete with all the features of a revolutionary political entity. All three branches of the organization acted in concert to legitimize and clothe the will of the people in republican and natural rights ideology. In turn, the military executed the policies of riotous insurgency in defense of the community's right of self-preservation. Having reinvented the land war in western Vermont, they turned it into widespread internal rebellion against New York and transformed it into a revolutionary republican experiment by founding the independent state of Vermont.

Furthermore, throughout the era of early Green Mountain Boy insurgency, Ethan Allen was not the prime mover but merely an instigator and expeditor of intensified, radical measures against New York. It must be remembered that not only did his peers and the political elders of the movement deny Allen the command of the very regiment he created

but because he was captured by the British in September 1775, Allen played no part in the founding of the state from late 1775 to July 1777.

The Green Mountain Boys were highly motivated social activists of significant political experience and vision. Their uncommon political acumen and audacity derived from their background as veterans of conflict in every sense of the word: military veterans of the last two French and Indian Wars; radical religious and political agitators during the Great Awakening; old hands at continual frontier removals and readjustment to socioeconomic change; and participants in and refugees from the early phases of New York's land war. Yeoman frontier farmers, small-scale town proprietors, social leaders, and moderate land speculators, they were the epitome of middle-class republicans.

All of these activist personality traits contributed to the Boys' unique political character. Contemporary observers recognized in these men a new breed of Yankee with a very special social agenda. Condescendingly referring to that agenda as a prescription for religious-political separatism, Elisha Paine of Cardigan, New Hampshire, called it the "Green Mountain Constitution."⁷⁶ Likewise, in the early 1760s British military observers denounced the land rioters in America, New York, and future Green Mountain Boys as "a riotous People and Levellers by Principle." After his defeat at the Battle of Bennington, British general John Burgoyne concurred, calling western Vermonters and the Boys "the most active and rebellious race of the Continent."⁷⁷ In the end, therefore, the Green Mountain Boys achieved and secured middle-class sociopolitical and economic structure not by any consensual, homogenized, democratic experience but through strife, agitation, resistance, riot, rebellion, and dual revolution.

NOTES

¹ See Michael A. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 317, n. 10, and appendix E, 285–286, for the most recent acknowledgment concerning the scarcity of biographical data on the Green Mountain Boys. For commentary on the tyranny of the Allens over early Vermont historiography, see J. Kevin Graffagnino, "The Vermont Story: Continuity and Change in Vermont Historiography," *Vermont History* 46 (spring 1978): 77–99.

² I researched genealogical and biographical data for this article at the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, Massachusetts, from 1994 to 1996. I coupled that data with the documentation in my Ph.D. dissertation, "Legacy of Dissent: Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Vermont, 1749–1784," Clark University, 1980, to complete the portrait. In addition to the popularizers of the Green Mountain Boys, two recent scholars pick up this theme of poverty-stricken failures: see, generally, Charles A. Jellison, *Ethan Allen: Frontier Rebel* (Taftsville, Vt.: Countryman Press, 1969), and Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws*. The prominent propagators of the rampant land speculator thesis are the original Vermont Progressive historians: Matt B. Jones, *Vermont in the Making, 1750–1777* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), and Chilton Williamson, *Vermont in Quandary: 1763–1825* (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1949). Two prominent Neoprogressive Vermont historians are J. Kevin Graffagnino and P. Jeffrey Potash, both of whom support the greedy land speculation, economic motivation interpretation. Graffagnino has two articles in that vein: "The Country My

Soul Delighted In': The Onion River Company and the Vermont Frontier," *New England Quarterly* 48 (1991): 24–60, and "Twenty Thousand Muskets!!!: Ira Allen and the Olive Branch Affair, 1796–1800," *William and Mary Quarterly* 48 (July 1991): 409–431. Potash's major work is *Vermont's Burned-Over District: Patterns of Community Development and Religious Activity, 1761–1850* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson, 1991).

³ There were two sources of republican ideology flowing into the American Revolution. The first, which Ethan Allen imbibed from Dr. Thomas Young, involved seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment political theory on natural rights derived from European political philosophers such as John Locke, Emmerich de Vattel, and Barons Montesquieu and Puffendorf. The second source was that of a group of eighteenth-century English coffeehouse radicals (called the "Commonwealthmen"), who perpetuated the radical principles of the seventeenth-century Puritan revolution into the eighteenth century and were most widely accepted among eighteenth-century American religious radicals. For the Commonwealthmen, see Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). In his study *Religion and the American Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), Alan Heimert shows how religious radicals appropriated the ideology of the Commonwealthmen, exactly in the fashion of the religiously devout Green Mountain Boys.

⁴ During the Great Awakening these groups—especially the Separates and Separate Baptists—separated from the churches they considered impure because they allowed unsaved Halfway Covenant members and their children to participate in Holy Communion. After separation, they created their own churches, agitating and petitioning provincial officials for separate parish status and exemption from the established church rates. Failing that, they refused to pay the rates and were civilly distrained for the property equivalent of the tax; riots against tax collectors ensued. Separate Baptists left the Separate churches over the issue of infant baptism, for which they found no scriptural basis.

⁵ I identified a total of 558 New York rioters. Of those, I have verified the origins of 477 (85 percent): 220 came from fifty Connecticut towns and 109 from Massachusetts, with (like the Green Mountain Boys) the greatest concentration in the upper Cape Cod region. Another 142 settlers came from Rhode Island and Long Island, New York (centers of dissident Quaker and Anglican religious orientation). They repeat the migratory patterns to western Vermont I mention later in this article, demonstrating two of the migratory paths to Vermont: (1) from southeastern Massachusetts into eastern Connecticut and then into western Connecticut, the Province Lands, and eastern New York; and (2) up the Hudson River from Long Island and Suffolk, Queens, and south Westchester Counties.

⁶ See, generally, *The Provincial and State Papers of New Hampshire*, 40 vols. (Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1867–1943), vol. 26, sub-vol. 3, *Town Charters*, 6–641. I reexamined all the original New Hampshire land grant charters for this project so as to identify original shareholders, especially residents of eastern New York and migrants to western Vermont.

⁷ The detailed metamorphosis of the Green Mountain organization is traced in Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," ch. 3, 279–349. In 1980 the depths of the connections between the two movements were not proven. Although the notion that the movements were interconnected is not original on my part, I have documented it. Those who suggested the link are Dixon Ryan Fox, *Yankees and Yorkers* (New York: New York University Press, 1940); Oscar Handlin, "The Eastern Frontier of New York," *New York Quarterly Journal* 18 (1937): 50–75; and Jones, *Vermont in the Making*, 297.

⁸ Before they became a Continental regiment and before they went to Ticonderoga, May 6–10, 1775, the Green Mountain Boys were a riotous guerrilla group. However, short of New York documentation of their riotous activity, records of various Green Mountain convention participants, and various genealogical claims, there is virtually no criterion for determining who (among the widespread participants in that organization) were early Green Mountain Boys. Nevertheless, by all accounts many more had to have participated. The methodological problem can be resolved by a solid assumption based upon the early research of Edward A. Hoyt, ed., "The Expeditionary Force to Ticonderoga" (typescript, Collaborative Study of the Works Progress Administration conducted with the Vermont Historical Society, 1942). That assumption is that Ethan Allen called upon the western town committees of safety (already established as the basic units of the resistance) to muster for the expedition all those militiamen who had previously belonged to or closely associated with the Green Mountain Boy militia units during their earlier riotous stages against New York. And their subsequent avid political support of the Vermont cause further substantiates the assumption.

On that supposition, I included another 230 men (in addition to the 157 I identified in my dissertation) in the Green Mountain rolls. I added another forty-nine men who were sidetracked from Ticonderoga to conduct concurrent expeditions to capture Skeensboro and Crown Point. By these calculations, I arrived at a total of 436 Green Mountain Boys. The logical corollary to these criteria, however, was that the cutoff point for inclusion in the Green Mountain ranks was May 1775. Therefore, I did not include anyone beyond that time frame. I also cross-referenced these 436 men with a most valuable source (based on revolutionary pension records) that indicates scores of men who

were with Allen at Ticonderoga: Carleton E. Fisher and Sue G. Fisher, *Soldiers, Sailors, and Patriots of the Revolutionary War—Vermont* (Camden, Me.: Picton Press, 1992).

⁹ Given the sparsity of contemporary commentary (short of political rhetoric) by any Vermonters about their political motivation, I had to rely mainly upon behavior to deduce different forms of political affiliation. For example, rioting in behalf of one cause or another was an obvious political statement, as were arrest for riot, participation in posses that rescued arrested riotous outlaws, and court prosecutions, affidavits, and witness statements implicating or defending various rioters. As well, all forms of officeholding, since they required jurisdictional oaths of allegiance, indicated political affiliation. Other indices of such affiliation included town meeting votes, representation in political conventions and special political action committees, association tests, public political statements, lists of political combinations and associations, and political preference statements inserted in land transactions.

From a military point of view, participation in any New York militia unit as a Vermont resident after Vermont's declaration of independence from New York in January 1777 and property distraint for refusal to serve in Vermont's militia also revealed political preference. Finally, lists of recomensatory grants in Romulus and Bainbridge, New York, granted to eastern pro-Yorkers in 1786 and 1791 as reward for their resistance to Vermont rule from 1777 to 1784, complete the file.

¹⁰ However, in order to compare the Boys with the other Vermont leadership groups, whose political evolution and coalescence were fluid over time, I had to extend their cutoff date beyond that for the Boys. Therefore, including the criteria listed in notes 8 and 9, I used four indices of political leadership singly or in any combination to select the 426 pro-Yorkers and 413 pro-Vermonters for comparison with the Green Mountain Boys: (1) all forms of officeholding; (2) leadership and participation in riotous groups supplemented by Vermont court records of trials of pro-Yorkers; (3) selection as representatives to political conventions and special action committees; (4) consistent leadership demonstrated by public political pronouncements and political petitions and testaments.

¹¹ The crucial question arising out of all of Vermont's diverse pre-Revolutionary experience is what caused the unification of east and west in repudiation of New York rule. Political diversity and anti-New York rioting were equally characteristic of eastern and western Vermont right up to early 1775; in fact, at the April 1775 Westminster convention eastern and western Vermont united to renounce New York rule in Vermont. Eastern rioting, moreover, concentrated upon the New York county court establishments in eastern Cumberland and Gloucester Counties in Vermont because they were the primary manifestations of detested New York rule in the region. Furthermore, statistical measurement revealed that the complex political jockeying in that region up to 1775–1776 involved a deeper shakedown and influx of New Light and Separate religious-political opposition to New York. For the full story of this shakedown, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," ch. 4 and appendices, 359–437.

¹² The migratory complexity of this period precludes any attempt to anchor political affiliation upon provincial origins and boundaries. Because these migrants moved back and forth over such boundaries and because all migration to Connecticut and New York began in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, their political orientation cannot be attributed to provincial origins.

¹³ By reason of its proprietary charter under the British Crown, the colony was included under the British religious Toleration Act of 1689 (a product of the Glorious Revolution), wherein practically all sects, except for Catholics and Unitarians, were allowed to worship freely. See W. E. Lunt, *History of England* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), 492.

¹⁴ Although he was on the right track concerning the interconnectedness of eastern New York rioters and western Vermonters, Fox attributed their differences to natural Yankee cultural, democratic antipathy toward feudal, aristocratic New York. See Fox, *Yankees and Yorkers*.

¹⁵ See Lillian Preiss, *Sheffield: A Frontier Town* (Sheffield, Mass.: Town of Sheffield, 1976), 7–36 and 171 for reference to the "Province Lands."

¹⁶ For Quaker and other radical religious refugees to Long Island and southern Westchester County, New York, see Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History*, 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. 3, 55n. and 124–133.

¹⁷ Michael Zuckerman posited the concept of "consensual communalism" in *Peaceable Kingdoms: New England Towns in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972). Zuckerman's contribution dealt with New England's conservative town meeting structural penchant for community consensus.

¹⁸ For definition of the pro-Yorker religious-political position, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 27–37.

¹⁹ Shaysites from north Worcester County, Massachusetts, and southeastern Vermont came from the very same Old Light north Worcester County towns. During the course of a collaborative experimental study with Dr. George A. Billias, professor emeritus of Clark University in 1979–1980, I could establish no causal connection between radical religion and Shaysite rioting; in fact, the reverse was true. A majority of over 1,000 Shaysites religiously documented in their towns of origin adhered to the Old Light/Old Side religious persuasions. In light of this research, it is obvious that

counterrevolutionary forces such as the pro-Yorkers and the Shaysites were linked to New England's consensual, communal, traditionalist viewpoints. These traditionalists justified counterriot and rebellion on the basis of maintaining consensual communalism and homogeneity despite intervening governmental authority.

²⁰ Deferential politics was based upon the notion of deferring to political elders and socially sophisticated leaders whose political expertise and superior social position were determinative. See, generally, Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967), and Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

²¹ For a comprehensive presentation of the religious differences between Arminians and Evangelicals, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," ch. 1 and the bibliography. The basic difference between the two groups was over the means of salvation and its outward manifestation: whether it could be willed (Old Light, Old Side, Anglican, Freewill Baptist, and Quaker) or was predetermined, as Calvin claimed (New Light, New Side, Separate, Separate Baptist); and whether it was demonstrated by "good works" (Old Light) or God's "grace" (New Light).

²² For an in-depth analysis of all the conventions leading to Vermont independence, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," ch. 5, 458–524. Conventioneers' religious affiliations broke down as follows: unknown 9 (4 percent), Arminians 29 (13 percent), and Evangelicals 187 (85 percent). Of the Evangelicals, 77 were New Light/New Side and 110 (almost 50 percent of all conventioneers) were Separate/Separate Baptist.

²³ For the essential sociopolitical and religious conservatism of the pro-Yorkers, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 27–34.

²⁴ See Williamson, *Vermont in Quandary*, 21.

²⁵ All of the preceding figures relate to "external mobility," that is, movement outside Vermont and prior to arrival in Vermont. I also measured internal movement from town to town within Vermont, taking into consideration wartime relocation in the west. If anything, internal mobility provides supplementary evidence of continued Green Mountain Boy mobility as opposed to the other groups. In the category of two-to-five town removals, the Boys had an overall internal mobility rate of 38 percent, pro-Vermonters 15 percent, and pro-Yorkers 13 percent.

²⁶ The breakdown of comparative ages of political conventioneers for all three groups is: known pro-Yorkers, 89 of 109, age forty-one; known pro-Vermonters, 66 of 84, age forty-three; Green Mountain Boys, 111 of 137, age forty-two.

²⁷ The average age breakdown for all these groups at the start of the Revolution is: known pro-Yorkers, 336 of 426, age 35.52 years; known pro-Vermonters 359 of 413, age 35.65 years; known Green Mountain Boys, 408 of 436, age 36.06 years.

²⁸ Although the demographic data for the pro-Yorkers and pro-Vermonters are not as complete as that for the Boys, they represent the most comprehensive data available on these groups. Moreover, it is clear that full definition of overall average marriage ages is an indeterminate number of a historically undefinable group. This indefiniteness is demonstrated by colonial New England demographers' studious avoidance of definition or projection of the total proportion of married to unmarried males in their studies. In fact, the only demographer who engages this topic is Wells; in his study of colonial Quaker marriage patterns, he found an inexplicable 43–48 percent proportion who never married.

Wells's findings combined with the data on the Green Mountain Boys' average marriage ages can be used to project marriage age totals for the two other leadership groups. For example, known Green Mountain Boy average marriage age figures show that 270 (61.93 percent) of the 436 total were married at an average age of 22.96 years. Given the totality of their social experience, which closely replicates that of the other two leadership groups, a safe educated estimate is that the ratio of married to unmarried males within the other leadership groups was about 62 percent to 38 percent. Therefore, on the basis of this prorated proportion, the estimate of married pro-Yorkers is 264, while the known figure of 167 represents 63.26 percent of the estimated total at an average marriage age of 26.04 years. Likewise, the known figure of 190 married pro-Vermonters represents 74.22 percent of the total of 256 estimated married men projected for their group, and with an average marriage age of 24.69 years. In both cases, then, the known cases are well over 50 percent of the estimated totals and are mathematically acceptable figures upon which to base comparative historical conclusions regarding central tendencies. Consequently, the comparative data represent a stark contrast of a three-year differential in marriage age between the Green Mountain Boys and the pro-Yorkers.

I based my demographic conclusions upon the following sources: Stephanie G. Wolf, *Population, Community, and Family Structure in Germantown, Pennsylvania, 1683–1800* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); James A. Henretta, "Morphology of New England," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1971–1972): 379–398; John J. Waters, "Family Inheritance and Migration in Colonial New England," *William and Mary Quarterly* 39 (January 1982): 64–86; Richard Archer,

"New England Mosaic: A Demographic Analysis of the Seventeenth Century," *William and Mary Quarterly* 47 (October 1990): 477-502; David S. Smith, "A Perspective on Methods and Effects in Social History," *William and Mary Quarterly* 39 (July 1982): 442-468; Robert V. Wells, "Quaker Marriage Patterns in Colonial Perspective," *William and Mary Quarterly* 29 (July 1972): 415-422; Robert Higgs and H. Louis Stettler, "Colonial New England Demography," *William and Mary Quarterly* 27 (April 1970): 282-294; John Demos, "Families in Colonial Bristol, Rhode Island," *William and Mary Quarterly* 25 (January 1968): 40-57; John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth County* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Kenneth J. Lockridge, *A New England Town* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).

²⁹ Although I have documented the marriage ages of only 122 wives (45 percent) of the 270 married Green Mountain Boys, their average marriage age of 20.81 years is fully consistent with Higgs and Stettler's data (see "Colonial New England Demography") compiled for the Haverhill, Massachusetts, area, although it is a year lower than most extant data on New England women and two years lower than the data I am now compiling on the pro-Yorkers' wives. Therefore, the data herein are at least indicative of a pattern of younger marriage ages for both the Boys and their wives.

³⁰ Green Mountain Boy trigenerational families included the following thirty families: the Allens of Pawlet, Bradleys, Brownsons, Burnhams, Castles, Clarks, Cooleys, Everests, Fassets, Fays, Gages, Harmones, Hathaways, Holmeses, Hopkinses, Hubbels, Hurds, Hydes, Meads, Posts, Robertses, Robinsons, Saffords, Smiths of Bennington and Rutland, and Spencers, Storrs, Van Arnems, and Walbridges. While I have not reconstructed all pro-Yorker families in their *absolute* entirety, there is more than sufficient evidence to show that they were mainly bigenerational.

³¹ See the Brattleboro pro-Yorkers' allegations against the Boys in E. P. Walton, ed., *Records of the Council of Safety and Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, 1775-1836*, 8 vols. (Montpelier, Vt.: J. M. Pollard, 1873-1880), vol. 1, 366.

³² For this accusation, see E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New York*, 4 vols. (Albany, N.Y.: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1850), vol. 4, 683, 694, 697.

³³ In particular, Jones in *Vermont in the Making*, 165, 197, and 353-354, repeats these claims, even though they are inconsistent with his data on pro-Yorker property holdings.

³⁴ Initially, I had thought to include the topic of conflicting land titles (New Hampshire versus New York original and confirmatory grants) as an economic factor that may have influenced political behavior, as the progressive historians Jones and Williamson argued. Because New York did confirm over twenty-seven eastern Vermont townships, both historians claimed that economic self-interest founded upon such grants (either by New Hampshire or New York) determined political affiliation. Thus pro-Yorkers' New York land grants, according to the progressives, dictated their adherence to the New York government. And, conversely, both pro-Vermonters' and Green Mountain Boys' New Hampshire titles automatically dictated their rebellion against New York to secure their interests. Clearly, for western Vermonters, especially large-scale speculators such as the Allens, there is merit to the progressives' argument. The complexity of the topic would, however, suggest otherwise. Eastern Vermonters' convulsion of the reconfirmatory process and the lack of any direct statistical link between grant titles and economic interest explains the exclusion of the topic. See Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 163-168. Consequently, it is sufficient to state that some other influence far more encompassing than economic self-interest produced Vermont's conflicting political affiliations.

³⁵ My current research indicates that even though the pro-Yorkers who staffed the eastern forts believed that their service entitled them to seniority in proprietary rights over all Vermont lands, others had claims just as valid. Many future Green Mountain Boys, both Dutch and English, staffed the western forts and were, therefore, equally early settlers.

³⁶ I ascertained the social status for 88 percent of the pro-Yorkers, 92 percent of the pro-Vermonters, and 85 percent of the Green Mountain Boys. In the yeoman category, pro-Yorkers had 61 percent, pro-Vermonters 64 percent, and the Boys 58 percent. In the gentleman category, pro-Yorkers had 24 percent, pro-Vermonters 25 percent, and the Boys 26.6 percent.

³⁷ For the last French and Indian War, the service records for all three groups are as follows: pro-Yorkers, 118 veterans, 28 percent of the 426-man group; pro-Vermonters, 110 veterans, 27 percent of the 413-man group; Green Mountain Boys, 148 veterans, 34 percent of the 436-man group.

³⁸ I researched landownership data presented herein during the work for my dissertation and recently supplemented this information by culling all the original New Hampshire Grant charters and all the extant western Vermont local town histories. In my dissertation research, I recorded all land transactions and proprietary records of eighty eastern and western Vermont townships from the 1740s through 1784. That process also included the reconstruction of the Allens' Union River Company holdings, separated from those lands held individually outside the company's purview. At best estimate, in the 1770s the company accumulated 65,000 acres of New Hampshire Grant wild lands. For the land sources, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 927-934.

³⁹ Vermont's Grand List tax data for the period are so limited, sporadic, and incomplete that the figures can be used only as relative economic indicators in conjunction with and reinforcing other supporting socioeconomic data. For a discussion of the pros and cons of Grand List tax data, see Potash, *Burned-Over District*, 63-70. Also, see Appendix 4B of this article for the statistics. For the tax lists used herein, see the "Annual Town Grand Lists": Addison, 1787; Arlington, 1787; Barnard, 1782; Cavendish, 1782; Manchester, 1784; Newfane, 1782; New Stamford, 1781; Poultney, 1781; Randolph, 1785; Thetford, 1781; Townshend, 1781; Tunbridge, 1787; and Wells, 1787, mss. bound vol., no. 23, Vermont State Archives, Montpelier.

⁴⁰ In the 1,000-3,999-acre range, the low-level pro-Yorker land speculators engrossed 97,234 acres, over 7,600 acres more than the Boys. Moreover, the pro-Yorkers' officeholding pattern placed 71 percent of their civil and military leaders in the gentleman social status category and only 28 percent in the yeoman category. Likewise, 32 percent of their legal officials were yeomen, while 68 percent were gentlemen. All these indicators represent a stratified within-group hierarchy based upon social and economic status.

⁴¹ For elaboration of the results of these forces, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 26-37.

⁴² For details of the manors' creation, see Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*, 4 vols. (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958), vol. 1, 237-284.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 266-292.

⁴⁴ The following are the Province Land towns: Becket, Charlmont, Cheshire (or New Providence), Dalton, Egremont, Great Barrington, Hancock, Jericho (or Gageboro), Lanesboro, New Framingham, New Glasgow, New Marlboro, North Adams, Sandisfield, Sheffield, Stockbridge, Tyrringham, and Williamstown.

⁴⁵ Throughout the land war, both in eastern New York and western Vermont, the New York government relied upon the British common law practice and power of local sheriffs and constables to raise the *posse committatus*—under various legislative reenactments of the traditional riot act—to put down rioters. However, in the case of Claverack rioting, both Colonels Livingston and Van Rensselaer seem to have assumed that their military powers were coeval with the New York government and usurped the posse power to their own purposes. They raised posses on their own and added county legal officials only as an adjunct of legality.

⁴⁶ The Stockbridge Indian deeds are printed in the opening pages of Egremont Bicentennial Committee, ed., *Egremont, 1756-1975* (Great Barrington, Mass.: Berkshire Courier, 1976). See also Isaac Jennings, *Memorials of a Century* (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1869), 405, for the Benningtonites' 1767 subscription movement to repurchase their lands from the Wappinger Indians. Further, scattered mention of the Indian deed option can be found in the sources cited for Claverack and Philipse Patent rioting.

⁴⁷ For accounts of the Albany County rioting, see O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 3, 729-832; H. S. Johnson, *History of Hillsdale, Columbia County, New York* (Philmont, N.Y.: E. J. Beardsley Sentinel Office, 1883); Franklin L. Pope, *The Western Boundary of Massachusetts* (Pittsfield, Mass.: N.p., 1886), 43-60; Philip J. Schwarz, *The Jarring Interests: New York's Boundary Markers, 1664-1775* (Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York, 1979), 100-119; "A Western Mass. Petition, 1757, Sheffield," *Genealogical Magazine* (April 1906): 65; Ruth A. Pinanka, ed., *A Portrait of Livingston Manor, 1686-1850* (Clermont, N.Y.: Friends of Clermont, 1986), 42-50.

⁴⁸ Apparently, at the insistence of New York officials who were pressing the issue of intercolonial cooperation for the war effort, Massachusetts authorities exercised some influence in quieting the Albany County rioters in 1757. See O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 3, 826.

⁴⁹ In 1762 the Claverack and Philipse Patent rioters acting in concert appointed rioter chieftan Robert Miller of Cortlandt Manor as agent to the New York governor to obtain New York's recognition of the Stockbridge Indian deeds in Livingston Manor. See *ibid.*, 825.

⁵⁰ I gleaned details of Philipse's Patent rioting from the following sources: "Calendar of New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783," in *University of State of New York Bulletin* 58 (March 1902): 433-471; E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. (Albany, N.Y.: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1856), vol. 7, 825-826; Frank J. Doherty, *Settlers of Beekman Patent, Dutchess County, New York*, 2 vols. (Pleasant Valley, N.Y.: Frank J. Doherty, 1993); Frank Hasbrouck, *The History of Dutchess County, New York* (Poughkeepsie, N.Y.: S. A. Matthieu, 1909), 53-85; Henry N. McCracken, *Old Dutchess Forever! The Story of an American County* (New York: N.p., 1965), 222-309; Emma J. Foster, "The Church of East Phillipi, Southeast, New York," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record* (October 1901-January 1902): 95, 213-214; William S. Pelletreau, *History of Putnam County, New York* (Philadelphia: W. N. Preston, 1886), 120-121, 294-295, 306-317, and 357-669; and Warren H. Wilson, *Quaker Hill in the Eighteenth Century* (Quaker Hill, N.Y.: N.p., 1905), 6-23.

⁵¹ For the details of both the rioting and its military termination, see McCracken, *Old Dutchess*, 307-309, and Pope, *Western Boundary*, 65. Lists of the rioters were derived from the following sources:

O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 3, 729–832; Irving Mark, *Agrarian Conflicts in New York, 1711–1775* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 131–201; Fox, *Yankees and Yorkers*; Handlin, "Eastern Frontier," 50–75; Handlin and Mark, "Land Cases in Colonial New York, 1765," *New York University Law Review* 19 (1942); Staughton Lynd, "Who Should Rule? Dutchess County, New York in the Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly* 18 (July 1961): 330–359; Sung Bok Kim, *Landlord and Tenant in Colonial New York* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 308–410; and Patricia U. Bonomi, *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). For genealogical and socioeconomic data on the rioters, see, generally, E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Calendar of New York Colonial Manuscripts: Endorsed Land Papers, 1643–1803*, 15 vols. (Harrison, N.Y.: Harbor Hill Books, 1987), vol. 13, 248; vol. 14, 252–260; John W. Barber and Henry Howe, *Historical Collections of the State of New York* (New York: S. Tuttle, 1841), 114–116; *Muster Rolls of New York Provincial Troops, 1755–1764*, vol. 25 of New York Historical Society *Collections for the Year 1891* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1891); *Abstracts of Wills on File with the Surrogate's Office, City of New York*, vol. 1 (1760–1766) of New York Historical Society *Collections for the Year 1897* (New York: New York Historical Society, 1898), 292; William A. Eardeley, "Marriage Records of Amenia, New York," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record*, 32–37 (January 1902–January 1905); *Burying Grounds of Sharon, Connecticut, Amenia, and Northeast, New York* (Amenia, N.Y.: Welsh, Griffen, and Haysradt, 1903), 26–77; F. N. Zabriskie, *History of the Reformed Dutch Church of Claverack* (Hudson, N.Y.: Stephen B. Miller, 1867), 45–46; Richard F. Maher, *Historic Dover*, 2d ed. (Amenia, N.Y.: N.p., 1966), 14–22; John N. Livingston, *The Minor Manors of the State of New York* (Clermont, N.Y.: Order of the Colonial Lords of Manors, 1923), 5; Stephen B. Miller, *Historical Sketches of Hudson, New York* (Hudson, N.Y.: Bryan & Webb Printers, 1862), 3–6, 39, 113; William McDermott, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Documents of the Nine Partners Patent, Dutchess County, New York*, vol. 10 of Dutchess County Historical Society *Collections* (Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1979); Isaac Hunting, *History of the Little Nine Partners of Northeast Precinct and Pine Plains, Dutchess County, New York*, 2 vols. (Amenia, N.Y.: Charles Walsh & Co., 1897), vol. 1, 15–16; Joseph M. Fox, *The Story of Early Peekskill, New York, 1609–1876* (Peekskill, N.Y.: Enterprise Press, 1947), 20–38; Jean D. Werden, comp., *The First and Second Dutch Reformed Church Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, New York, 1716–1912* (typescript, 1922), 15–26.

⁵² Within the Province Lands and eastern New York borderland riot impact zones alone, there were 144 original New Hampshire Grant shareholders: sixty-nine in Massachusetts and seventy-five in New York. From all of these sources, rioter and nonrioter, 434 future western Vermont settlers—including thirty-six future Green Mountain Boys and sixty-five future western Vermonters who were former New York rioters—purchased their lands in Vermont.

⁵³ For a list of the Green Mountain Boys as former New York rioters, see Appendix 3A.

⁵⁴ For influx from New York, see Table 1.

⁵⁵ O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 4, 574–578.

⁵⁶ For the diverse geographical makeup of the Bennington church, see Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," 68–71.

⁵⁷ Jennings, *Memorials*, 69.

⁵⁸ For a similar movement among the New York rioters, see petitions to the king, dated 27 February 1764 and 21 November 1766, from the inhabitants of Beekman's-Philipse Gore, in Doherty, *Beekman Patent*, vol. 1, 388–389, 406–408.

⁵⁹ Jennings, *Memorials*, 405.

⁶⁰ O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 4, 615–619.

⁶¹ Concerning the Hazeltine connection, see Upton, *Massachusetts, 1735–1935* (Upton, Mass.: "Four Friends," 1935), 11, 16; William A. Benedict, *History of Sutton, Massachusetts, 1704–1876* (Worcester, Mass.: Sanford & Co., 1878), 45; and John Pell, *Ethan Allen* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1929), 76. For a reference to the Ashley connection, see Pope, *Western Boundary*, 49; Preiss, *Sheffield*, 16, 34; and McCracken, *Old Dutchess*, 251.

⁶² The Lydius deeds in Clarendon, which he renamed "Durham," are in Town of Clarendon, "Property and Vital Records, 1778–1825," 4 vols., Microfilm files 2577 and 2578, Public Records Division, Middlesex, Vermont.

⁶³ For a reference to Lydius's activities, see Pinanka, *Livingston Manor*, 46, and O'Callaghan, *New Documentary History*, vol. 3, 767.

⁶⁴ Concerning Dr. Young, see Jellison, *Frontier Rebel*, 5, 16.

⁶⁵ See Smith, "Legacy of Dissent," ch. 3, 279–350; and specifically the third subsection.

⁶⁶ Ira Allen, "An Address to the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont," *Provincial and State Papers of New Hampshire*, 10, 347–354.

⁶⁷ For the Bennington convention of July 1772 and its aftermath, see O'Callaghan, *New Documentary History*, vol. 4, 778–779 and 794–795; William J. Slade, ed., *Vermont State Papers, 1779–1786*

(Middlebury, Vt.: William J. Slade, 1823), 30–33; *Collections of the Vermont Historical Society*, 4 vols. (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1870, 1943), vol. 1, 7; Jellison, *Frontier Rebel*, 72; James B. Wilbur, *Ira Allen, Founder of Vermont, 1751–1814*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1928), vol. 1, 73–83.

⁶⁸ For genealogical data on Micah Vail, see William P. Vail, *Moses Vail of Huntington, Long Island* (N.p., 1947), 39, 195. For data on Vail as a rioter, see McCracken, *Old Dutchess*, 308–309; Bonomi, *Factious People*, 221; Mark, *Agrarian Conflicts*, 141; and O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 3, 727.

⁶⁹ Ethan's letter is reproduced in J. C. Williams, *History and Map of Danby, Vermont* (Rutland, Vt.: N.p., 1869), 30.

⁷⁰ Ethan Allen made his first contribution in behalf of the grantsmen as coordinator of the legal defense effort for the Boys who were subjected to New York ejectment suits in June 1770. He hired prominent Connecticut lawyer Jared Ingersoll to defend their cause. See O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 4, 619–621, 679, 863–865; *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, vol. 1, 153–154, 343; and Jones, *Vermont in the Making*, 172–175, 201–202.

⁷¹ Bonomi, *Factious People*, 221.

⁷² O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 4, 728.

⁷³ For safety committee organization, see Walton, *Governor and Council*, vol. 1, 3 and *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, vol. 1, 5–8.

⁷⁴ For Green Mountain Boy law, see *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, vol. 1, 344–353, 358–359.

⁷⁵ Two massed military raids (involving 100 to 150 Green Mountain Boys) were conducted in 1773, the first against New York settlers near Otter Creek in August and the second against the town of Clarendon in November. See O'Callaghan, *New Documentary History*, vol. 4, 842–868.

⁷⁶ *The Upper Connecticut: Narratives of Its Settlement and Its Part in the American Revolution*, vol. 1 of vol. 2, *Vermont Historical Society Collections*, 3 vols. (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1943), 67.

⁷⁷ Burgoyne's comment is quoted in Clifford Alderman, *Gathering Storm: The Story of the Green Mountain Boys* (New York: Julian Messner, 1970), 176; and the comment on the Amenia rioters in O'Callaghan, *New York Documentary History*, vol. 3, 987.

APPENDIX 1
Generational Tables

	<i>Pro-Vermont</i>		<i>Pro-New York</i>		<i>Green Mtn. Boys</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Generation 1 (ages 13-21)	40	9.69	48	11.27	46	10.55
Generation 2 (ages 22-44)	260	62.95	215	50.47	254	58.26
Generation 3 (ages 45-67)	58	14.04	69	16.2	101	23.17
Age range						
68 plus	1	0.24	4	0.94	7	1.61
Unknown data	54	13.08	90	21.13	28	6.42
Total	413	100	426	100	436	100

APPENDIX 2

Western Vermont Migration Origins: New York Manors and Riot Zones

	<i>Number</i>	<i>% of Total</i>	<i>% Total Vermont</i>
			<i>Population</i> 1675 Circa 1775
Philipsburg Manor	24	2.85	1.43
Cortlandt Manor	48	6.85	2.86
Morris' Patent	3	4.28	0.02
Stone Rob Patent	1	0.14	0.01
Rumbout Patent	2	0.29	0.01
Schulyer's Patent	2	0.29	0.01
Pawling's Patent	47	6.70	2.81
Beekman's Pat/Pct.	120	17.12	7.16
Philipse's Patent	122	17.40	7.28
Livingston Manor	68	9.70	4.06
Rensselaerwyck Manor	132	18.83	7.88
Leashold Ltl. Nine Partners	5	0.71	0.30
Subtotal	574	82	34.37
Freehold Precincts Below			
Nine Partners and Great Nine Partners	70	10.00	4.18
Amenia	57	8.13	3.40
Subtotal Freehold	127	18.00	7.58
Total	701	100	41.85

APPENDIX 3
Vermonters Identified as Former New York Rioters

A. Green Mountain Boys as Former New York Rioters		
	<i>Riot Location</i>	<i>Vt. Residence</i>
Andrews, Cpt. Isaac	Nobletown, Livingston Manor	Shaftsbury
Benson, Stutson	Beekman's/Oblong Gore	Wallumschack Pat.
Charles, Isaac	Hoosic Patent/Rensselaerwyck	Arlington
Chase, Abraham	Beekman's/Philipse Gore	Danby
Cross, Ichabod Sr.	Philipse's Patent	Shaftsbury
Cross, John	Cortlandt Manor/So. Dutch Cty	Shaftsbury
Crow, Isaac	Philipse's Patent	Poultney
Crow, Lt. Joseph Sr.	Philipse's Patent	Poultney
Crow, Joseph Jr.	Philipse's Patent	Poultney
Douglas, Asa Sr.	Rensselaerwyck Manor	Shelburne
Hopkins, John	Philipse's Patent	Wallingford
Hopkins, Cpt. Michael	Beekman's Pat/Livingston Mnr.	Danby
Hopkins, Dea. Nehemiah	Livingston Manor	Pittsford
Hopkins, Col. Roswell Jr.	Amenia, New York	Bennington
Horsford, John	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Arlington
Horsford, Sgt. Samuel	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Bennington
Kellogg, William	Livingston & Rensselaerwyck	Rutland
Lawrence, Cpt. Isaac	Philipse's Patent	Hinesburg/Monckton
Manley, Dea. John Sr.	Philipse's Patent	Dorset
Manley, John, Jr.	Philipse's Patent	Dorset
Northrup, Nathaniel Sr.	Philipse's Patent	Castleton
Philips, John	Beekman's/Oblong Gore	Pownal/Bennington
Roberts, William Sr.	Livingston Manor	Clar./Manch/Rutland
Robinson, Dea. Saml. Sr.	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Bennington
Robinson, Col. Saml. Jr.	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Bennington
Searle, Cpt. Isaac	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Arlington
Searle, John	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Arlington
Smith, Nathan III	Nobletown/Livingston Manor	Manchester/Bridport
Stevens, Cpt. Benj. Sr.	Beekman's Patent	Manchester/Pittsford
Stockwell, Lt. Levi	Livingston Manor	Pownal/Skeensboro
Stodder, Elijah	Claverack/Rensselaerwyck Mnr.	Clarendon/Sunderland
Vail (Veal), Cpt. Micah	Nine Partners, New York	Danby
Van Arnem, Cpt. Abraham	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Pownal
Van Arnem, Abraham Jr.	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Pownal
Van Arnem, Cpt. Isaac Sr.	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Pownal
Van Arnem, John	Hoosic Pat./Rensselaerwyck	Pownal
Willard, Jonathan Sr.	Livingston Manor	Pawlet

APPENDIX 3 (cont.)

B. Eastern Vermonters as Former New York Rioters

	<i>Riot Location</i>	<i>Vt. Residence</i>
Barber, Benjamin	Beek's/Philipse/Oblong Gore	Halifax
Baxter, Thomas	Cortlandt & Philipse Pat	Halifax
Benton, Josiah	Philipse's Patent	Norwich
Beavins, Sgt. Jacob	Claverack/Rensselaerwyck	Woodstock
Bishop, John	Cortlandt/So. Pct. Dutch Cty	Hartland
Burch, Benjamin (1723)	Beekman's Philipse Gore	Hartford
Burch, Benjamin (1731)	Beekman's Patent	Hrtfd/Woodstock
Burch, Benjamin Jr.	Beekman's/Philipse Gore	Hartford
Burch, Jacob	Beekman's Patent	Pomfret
Burch, John	Beekman's Patent	Hartfrd/Hartland
Burch, Jonathan Jr.	Beekman's/Philipse Gore	Pomfret/Hartland
Cady, Cpl. Manassah	Beek's/Philipse/Oblong Gore	Hartland
Covey, Joe (Joseph)	Philipse's Patent	Dummrstn/Athens
Darbee, Lt. Jonathan	Livingston Manor	Bradford
Eliot, David	Beek's/Philipse/Oblong Gore	Halifax
Gilbert, Moses	Nobletown, Livingston Manor	Putney
Hodges, Isaac	Beekman's/Philipse Gore	Pomfret
Jenkins, James	Philipse's Patent	Bradford
Kelsey, Daniel	Claverack/Livingston Manor	Whiting/Hartland
Lovejoy, Andrew	Claverack/Livingston Manor	Sharon
Lovejoy, Benjamin	Oblong/Pawling's NY	Sharon
Merrick, Cpt. Ebenezer	Beekman's/Philipse Gore	Newfane
Paddock, John III	Philipse's Patent	Woodstock
Paddock, William	Philipse's Patent	Woodstock
Paine, Ebenezer	Livingston Manor	Hartland
Rogers, Samuel	Oblong/Pawlings Pat.	Thetford
Stevens, Andrew Jr.	So. Pct. Dutch. Cty.	Barnard
Stephens, Henry	Beek's/Oblong/Philipse/Gore	Windsor
Stiles, John, Esq.	Philipse's Patent	Andover
Way, John	Livingston Manor	Newbury/Peacham
Weeks, Benjamin	Philipse's Patent	Halifax
Whitney, Nathan	Liv. Manor/Ancram	Halifax

APPENDIX 4

A. Comparative Proprietary Statistics

	<i>Pro-Vermont</i>		<i>Pro-New York</i>		<i>Green Mtn. Boys</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
One town proprietary	139	75.54	78	57.78	154	64.44
Two town proprietary	30	16.3	21	15.56	42	17.57
Three town proprietary	9	4.89	11	8.15	24	10.04
Four to six towns	6	3.36	16	11.85	11	4.6
Over six towns	0	-	9	6.67	8	3.35
Totals	184	100	135	100	239	100

B. Grand List Tax Data

	<i>Pro-Vermont</i>		<i>Pro-New York</i>		<i>Green Mtn. Boys</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
£1-50	92	73.02	44	81.48	43	67.19
£51-170	34	26.98	10	18.62	21	32.81
Totals	126	100	54	100	64	100

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